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Abstract 
In 2005 the Australian State of Victoria abolished the controversial partial defence of 
provocation. Part of the impetus for the reforms was to challenge provocation’s victim-
blaming narratives and the defence’s tendency to excuse men’s violence against intimate 
partners. However, concerns were also expressed that these narratives and excuses would 
simply reappear at the sentencing stage when men who had killed intimate partners were 
convicted of murder or manslaughter. This paper analyses post-provocation sentencing 
judgments, reviewing cases over the 10 year period since the reforms in order to determine 
whether these concerns have been borne out. The analysis suggests that at the level of 
sentencing outcomes they have not, although at the level of discourse the picture is more 
mixed. While sentencing narratives continue to reproduce the language of provocation, at 
the same time, post-provocation sentencing appears to provide opportunities for feminist 
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judging – picking up on the spirit of the reforms – which have been taken up by some judges 
more than others. 
 
Keywords 




The partial defence to murder of provocation was abolished in the Australian state of 
Victoria in 2005. Unlike the full defence of self-defence, which, if successfully argued, results 
in an accused person being acquitted of murder, a successful defence of provocation 
resulted in a verdict of not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. The elements that 
were required to be proven in order for the defence of provocation to succeed were: the 
deceased must have said something and/or acted in a way that was provocative; the 
accused must have lost self-control as a result of the provocation and killed the deceased 
while experiencing that loss of self-control; and the provocation must have been such that it 
was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and form an intention to 
inflict grievous bodily harm or death (VLRC, 2004: 23).1 While the partial provocation 
defence remains available in Victoria for offences committed prior to 22 November 2005, it 
can no longer operate to reduce murder to manslaughter for homicides committed on or 
after that date. Provocation will, however, still be relevant to the task of the sentencing 
judge when sentencing an offender for murder or manslaughter.  
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Feminist critiques of the partial defence of provocation have been well rehearsed 
(e.g. Bandalli, 1995; Fitz-Gibbon, 2014; Horder, 1992; Howe, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2013, 2014; 
Morgan, 1997; Nourse, 1997; Radford, 1987; Tarrant, 1996; Tyson, 1999, 2013). The 
abolition of provocation in Victoria was part of a comprehensive package of reforms 
introduced by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic). The reforms sought to address long-
standing concerns about the gendered operation of the defences to homicide – namely, that 
the availability and operation of the partial defence of provocation has tended to privilege 
men who kill their intimate partners and to blame women for inciting their own deaths. 
Men in this context often argued that the provocative conduct was that their partner had 
been unfaithful or had taunted them about their sexual performance. However, such claims 
tended to mask actual motivations of jealousy, possessiveness or a need for control, and the 
killing tended to occur when the deceased was attempting to leave or had left the 
relationship (Morgan, 1997: 247-250, 2002: 21-30). In contrast, women rarely kill in the 
same circumstances as men; rather, when women relied on the defence, they were often 
responding to a prior history of abuse perpetrated against them by their partners (VLRC, 
2004: xxv).  
The way the full defence of self-defence was interpreted and applied was also seen 
to disadvantage women. Men are most often successful in raising self-defence when they 
kill in a confrontational situation, usually a stranger, acquaintance or friend. As women 
rarely kill in these circumstances, they often face a number of barriers to establishing their 
actions as self-defence (VLRC, 2004: xxvi). In addition to the abolition of provocation, the 
reforms included the codification of self-defence as a defence to murder and expansion of 
the scope of the defence so that it is more capable of accommodating the experiences of 
abused women. The offence of defensive homicide was also introduced, which, up until its 
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abolition in 2014 by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 
(Vic), provided a partial defence for defendants who killed in circumstances in which they 
believed their actions were necessary in order to defend themselves from death or really 
serious injury, but they did not have reasonable grounds for that belief. Finally, the Act 
introduced a new section into the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (originally s 9AH, since 2014 s 322J) 
which provides for the admission of evidence highlighting the relationship and social context 
of family violence in cases of homicide where family violence is alleged. 
The abolition of provocation was one of the key recommendations made by the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) in its Defences to Homicide: Final Report (VLRC, 
2004). In considering whether the partial defence of provocation should be abolished 
and/or a new partial defence should be introduced, the VLRC’s general approach to the 
factors that reduce or eliminate criminal culpability, was that these should be informed by 
the empirical literature on the social contexts in which homicides typically occur (2004: 4). 
The VLRC were also guided by substantive equality principles (2002: 66, 2003: xvii-xviii, 95-
96; see also Morgan, 2002). In their report, the VLRC were concerned that ‘the moral basis 
of provocation’ was ‘inconsistent with contemporary community values and views on what 
is excusable behaviour’ (2004: 56). Of particular concern was how provocation operated as a 
legitimate excuse for a person to kill another person, usually a woman, who was exercising 
her ‘personal rights, for instance to leave a relationship or to start a new relationship with 
another person’ (2004: 56). Accordingly, the VLRC were of the view that ‘[p]eople should be 
expected to control their behaviour—even when provoked’ and that retention of the 
defence of provocation ‘also sends a message that the homicide victim is somehow to 
blame for their own death’ while the male defendant’s ‘violent loss of self-control [was] 
partly excusable’ (2004: 56). In agreement with key feminist commentators that the partial 
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defence of provocation was ‘beyond redemption’ (Howe, 2002: 43), the VLRC recommended 
that it should be abolished (VLRC, 2004: xlv), and concluded that ‘[d]ifferences in degrees of 
culpability for intentional killing should be dealt with at the sentencing stage’ (2004: 4).  
The partial defence of provocation has also been abolished or modified in a number 
of other jurisdictions. It was first abolished in the Australian state of Tasmania in 2003 
(Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of the Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas)) and 
was subsequently abolished in Western Australia in 2008 (Criminal Law Amendment 
(Homicide) Act 2008 (WA)). In 2007, the New Zealand Law Reform Commission (NZLRC) 
recommended abolition of provocation and changes to the law on self-defence. The NZLRC 
also recommended that priority should be given to the development of sentencing 
guidelines to ensure ‘full and fair account’ is given to provocation mitigation at sentencing 
(2007: paras 2.04 and 2.08). Provocation was abolished by the Crimes (Provocation (Repeal)) 
Amendment Act 2009 (NZ), but none of the other recommendations were acted upon. As 
Wake has observed, the result is that self-defence law in New Zealand remains manifestly 
inadequate internationally in the way it responds when victims of family violence kill their 
abusers (2015: 165). The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) abolished the partial defence of 
provocation, and introduced a new partial defence of ‘loss of control’ applicable to England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  Contained within ss 54 and 55 of the Act and retaining a key 
element of the old partial defence, the ‘qualifying trigger’, the partial defence of ‘loss of 
control’ includes the stipulation that ‘the fact that a thing said or done constituted sexual 
infidelity is to be disregarded’ (s 55(6)(c)). Section 54(3) of the Act provides that the 
qualifying trigger for loss of control can be a ‘fear of serious violence’ from the victim to the 
defendant or another identified person. Alternatively, s 54(4) provides that the qualifying 
trigger can be ‘a thing or things done or said (or both) which—(a) constituted circumstances 
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of an extremely grave character, and (b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged’. (For overviews of recent debates and criticism of the ‘loss of control’ 
defence see Horder and Fitz-Gibbon, 2015; Howe, 2013, 2014; Reed and Bohland, 2011). 
Shortly after a New South Wales (NSW) Select Committee on the Partial Defence of 
Provocation published its Final Report (2013) in which it recommended that the partial 
defence of provocation be ‘relabelled’ a defence of ‘gross provocation’, a reform structured 
along the lines recommended by the Law Commission for England and Wales in 2004, the 
NSW government responded with a different proposal for a partial defence of ‘extreme 
provocation’ (Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW); for a discussion of this 
proposal see Crofts and Loughnan, 2014).  
The VLRC argued that a key benefit of shifting claims of provocation to the realm of 
sentencing was that it would give greater flexibility to judges about which sentence to 
impose (2004: 33). However, many remained concerned that this would do little to 
challenge exculpatory narratives for men’s violence against women (Bradfield, 2003; Burton, 
2003; Howe, 2002, 2004). As Morgan observed, leaving ‘provocative’ facts to the discretion 
of a judge in sentencing ‘will do nothing to remove the gendered assumptions embodied in 
the … use of the provocation defence by men in situations of “sexual jealousy”’ (1997: 275-
76). A related concern was whether provocation’s victim-blaming narratives would simply 
be redeployed in the guise of other offences such as manslaughter (Tyson, 2011). These 
expressions of apprehension are not altogether surprising given the tendency for sentencing 
in cases of domestic homicide to undermine legal reforms designed to benefit women 
(Burton, 2003; Easteal, 1993a, 1993b). As Freiberg, Gelb and Stewart have observed, while it 
is important to bear in mind that ‘[r]ecognising the objectionable features of the partial 
defence of provocation does not mean that provocation is not a legitimate mitigating factor 
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in sentencing that should, in appropriate cases, be acknowledged by the court’ (2015: 59), it 
is crucial that with ‘the transformation of the law of provocation, the past should not 
continue to influence the present in undesirable ways and the partial defence should not re-
emerge in a new guise as a particular variety of murder’ (Stewart and Freiberg, 2009: vii, 2). 
This would seem to require judges to draw a distinction between when ‘provocative’ 
conduct is not a legitimate mitigating factor (for example in cases of rage, jealousy, 
infidelity, separation or estrangement), and when it is.  
There is no mandatory life sentence for murder in Victoria. Judges, therefore, have a 
wide discretion in sentencing, taking into account general sentencing principles and 
weighing up aggravating and mitigating factors in each individual case. To date, with a few 
exceptions (Burton, 2003; Freiberg, Gelb and Stewart, 2015; Hall et al., 2015; Horder and 
Fitz-Gibbon, 2015), there has been little research that has examined provocation as an 
independent factor in sentencing (Stewart and Freiberg, 2008: 285). The general principles 
of sentencing are to be found in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) and common law (Freiberg, 
2014). The purposes of sentencing – punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation 
and the protection of the community from the offender – are to be found in s 5(1) of the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). Section 5(2) of the Sentencing Act sets out the factors that a court 
must take into account when sentencing an offender, including: the maximum penalty 
prescribed for the offence; current sentencing practices; the nature and gravity of the 
offence; the offender’s culpability and degree of responsibility for the offence; and the 
presence of any aggravating or mitigating factors concerning the offender or of any other 
relevant circumstances.  
The policy issues relating to sentencing for murder and other offences against the 
person flowing from the abolition of provocation were canvassed in a research report 
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entitled Provocation in Sentencing by Stewart and Freiberg (2008, 2009). In the report, the 
authors reflect on the need to give effect to the intentions of the VLRC and Parliament and 
argue that ‘[i]f the underlying purposes of the legislation are to be achieved, it is imperative 
that the problems and flaws of the pre-existing law not be transferred from the substantive 
law into the law of sentencing’ (2009: vii, 2). Rather than adopt a traditional approach to 
provocation mitigation in sentencing, which is to treat it as ‘one of the myriad of general 
mitigating circumstances that a judge must consider’, Stewart and Freiberg propose a new 
normative framework for dealing with provocation in sentencing which draws on a ‘reasons-
based approach to culpability in sentencing’ (2008: 291) ‘advocated by the VLRC as well as 
approaches to provocation in sentencing in other jurisdictions’ such as Tasmania (2009: 63). 
The focus, they argue, should not be on whether ‘the offender lost self-control or that the 
provocation was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control’ (2009: 63). 
Rather, an offender’s culpability should be reduced only when the response of being 
frightened, angry or resentful is for ‘good reasons’, although they note that fear, anger and 
resentment in some cases may have led to excessive or inappropriate behaviour. Thus, they 
conclude that:  
[a]lthough there is a need to contextualise provocation, including by reference to the 
offender’s personal characteristics, the overriding consideration should be whether 
the offender’s aggrievement at this conduct is justified in the circumstances. Thus an 
appropriate approach would be to ask whether the victim’s conduct gave the 
offender a justifiable sense of being wronged, judged not only by reference to the 
offender’s personal circumstances, but also in accordance with equality principles 
(2008: 298).   
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This proposal echoes the current English partial defence of ‘loss of control’ in its reference 
to ‘a justifiable sense of being wronged’, although it adds a broader caveat about how that 
should be judged – not simply disregarding infidelity, but in accordance with equality 
principles – in order to transcend traditional, male-centred notions of injury. Stewart and 
Freiberg thus offer an alternative approach to provocation mitigation focused on the 
wrongfulness of the victim’s actions and justifiability of the offender’s aggrievement, rather 
than on whether the offender lost self-control as a result of anything said or done by the 
victim. It is an approach grounded in the view that lethal violence that arose in response to 
the deceased exercising (her) equality rights (e.g. an equal right to autonomy and self-
determination in relationships, friendships, work or education) should not reduce an 
offender’s culpability.  
The  Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 has been described as among the most radical of 
feminist-inspired reforms aimed at remediating gender bias in legal responses to men and 
women who kill intimate partners (Coss, 2006; Forrell, 2006; Ramsey, 2010). The value of 
feminist law reform strategies, however, has been the subject of two, related debates. First, 
feminist critical theorists have argued that law invariably does more harm than good to 
women; consequently, feminist law reforms are doomed to failure, and feminists ought to 
resist law’s claims to be a force for good and focus their efforts on challenging legal and 
wider discursive constructions of gender (Brown, 1995; Frug, 1992; Jhappan, 1998; Smart, 
1989, 1990, 1995; Thornton, 1991). While this has been a powerful and influential 
argument, it has also been contested as being overly pessimistic and essentialist, and as 
failing to account for potential ambivalence in the meaning of particular reforms (Hunter, 
2012; Sandland, 1995). Secondly, feminist socio-legal scholars have argued that feminist 
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efforts to change legal doctrine must be accompanied by attention to how (and by whom) 
those reforms are to be implemented (Hunter, 2008; Stanko, 1985; Rhode, 1997; Römkens, 
2001). This should involve both consideration of implementation issues at the drafting stage 
(as indicated, for example, by Morgan’s concerns cited above), and empirical investigation 
of the implementation process after reforms have been enacted. In Hunter’s words, before 
we can announce the success or otherwise of feminist reforms, ‘it is necessary to determine 
how [they] are actually operating in practice’ (2008: 6).  
This article locates itself primarily within the second of these debates. 
Acknowledging that the implementation of the Crime (Homicide) Act 2005 depends upon 
the ‘internal legal culture’ (Friedman, 1985; Hunter, 2008) of the lawyers and judges 
involved in cases of intimate partner homicide, we set out to examine the degree of 
congruence between the aspirations of the feminist reformers and the attitudes of the legal 
enforcers as to the wider implications of the abolition of provocation as a defence to 
murder.  Although it is not the primary focus of the article, our findings do also make some 
contribution to the first debate, in providing a nuanced account of the outcomes of law 
reform, and in particular by showing how alternative representations of women’s lives and 
gender relations may be generated within as well as outside law. We should also stress that 
our aim in this article is to investigate the application of the provocation reforms to men 
who kill. We do not discuss their application to women who kill abusive partners, which 
raises different issues and has been the subject of separate research (see Kirkwood et al., 
2013; Tyson et al., 2015; Tyson et al., 2016). 
To determine whether, and to what extent, provocation’s ‘exculpatory narratives of 
excuse for male violence’ (Tyson, 2013: 126) are being redeployed at the sentencing stage 
following the enactment of the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005, we undertook a systematic 
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examination of sentencing judgments, reviewing all cases of men who were found guilty of 
domestic homicide (as defined below) over the 10-year period since the 2005 reforms.  In 
the following section we describe our methodology, before going on to examine the 
guidance on provocation mitigation in homicide cases given to sentencing judges by the 
Victorian Sentencing Manual and by the post-abolition jurisprudence of the Victorian Court 
of Appeal. We then discuss the findings of our analysis of sentencing judgments, both in 
terms of judicial responses to provocation mitigation arguments in domestic homicide 
cases, and more general judicial attitudes towards the reforms to homicide law.  
 
Methodology 
In this study, we were interested in determining the extent to which problematic 
provocation-type narratives have reappeared in the sentencing process in cases involving a 
man who killed a female intimate partner. We define provocation-type narratives as either 
explicit or implicit claims that the defendant killed the deceased as a result of a sudden or 
spontaneous loss of self-control in response to some form of provocation by the deceased, 
including nagging, wounding the defendant’s pride, expressing a desire or making 
arrangements to leave the relationship, entering a new relationship with another man, or 
admitting to or describing sexual activity with another man.   
Cases were identified via the Australasian Legal Information Institute (Austlii) 
database, which is a comprehensive on-line database of Australian legislation and case law. 
The one limitation of this database is that a small number of sentencing judgments are 
restricted and hence not published online to protect individuals involved in the case. Cases 
used for analysis were selected using the following procedure. First, all sentencing 
judgments for murder or manslaughter between 22 November 2005 and the end of 2015 
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were identified. Second, we filtered out any cases where the killing was committed prior to 
22 November 2005 as we wanted to focus on those judgments delivered in respect of 
deaths which occurred after the abolition of the partial defence of provocation. Thirdly, we 
included those judgments involving a male defendant who killed either an intimate female 
partner or a male sexual rival, following Morgan’s insight that ‘some instances of men killing 
men share much in common with some instances of men killing women and should be 
connected, notwithstanding the different gender of the victims’ (2002: 23). We excluded 
cases where the defendant was charged with incitement to murder rather than the killing 
itself, since these cases by definition involve pre-mediation and are not susceptible to 
provocation-type arguments. We also excluded two cases in which gay men killed male 
sexual partners, because the gender issues involved in these cases would have required 
significant further analysis, drawing us away from our main focus on the gendered 
narratives constructed around heterosexual relationships. Finally, as indicated above, we 
excluded cases in which women killed men or other women, since the kind of victim-
blaming and excuses for men’s violence that the provocation reforms were designed to 
eliminate do not generally appear in cases in which women kill.2 
In total, we analysed 76 judgments. Of these, 61 cases were sentences following 
convictions for domestic homicide (i.e. homicide in an intimate context as just described) 
committed by men in Victoria and 15 were appeals (see Table 1). Of the 61 domestic 
homicide sentencing cases, the victim was the defendant’s partner in 51 cases and another 
man in 10 cases (see Table 2).  In 41 cases the defendant was found guilty of, or pleaded 
guilty to, murder. This figure includes one defendant who was convicted of murder twice, 
having been originally convicted at trial, successfully appealed against his conviction, and 
convicted again on a retrial (R v. Azizi, 2010; Azizi v. R, 2012; DPP v. Azizi, 2013). There was 
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one other case where the defendant was found guilty of murder but his conviction was 
quashed on appeal and a verdict of manslaughter was substituted (R v. Mocenigo, 2012; 
Mocenigo v. R, 2013).  In 16 cases the defendant was found or pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter; in one case the defendant pleaded guilty to arson causing death; and in two 
cases the defendant was found or pleaded guilty to defensive homicide, the new offence 
introduced simultaneously with the abolition of provocation by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 
2005. The outcome of the second defensive homicide case (R v. Middendorp, 2010) caused a 
public outcry, as the defendant was taken to have been defending himself against a victim 
to whom he had previously been seriously violent on a number of occasions, who was much 
smaller and weaker than him, and whom he stabbed in the back (Capper and Crooks, 2010; 
Howe, 2010; Tyson, 2011: 214-216). The crime of defensive homicide has subsequently itself 
been abolished by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 
(Vic)).3  
In one quarter of the cases (15 of the 61) the defendant appealed against his 
conviction and/or sentence or the Office of Public Prosecutions appealed against the 
leniency of the sentence to the Victorian Court of Appeal. Two thirds of the appeals were 
dismissed (10 out of 15). In three cases, the defendant’s appeal against sentence was 
allowed and the appellant received a reduced sentence (R v. Jagroop, 2009; Bayram v. R, 
2012; McPhee v. R, 2014). In the remaining two cases already mentioned, the defendant’s 
appeal against conviction was successful (Azizi, 2012; Mocenigo, 2013) (see Table 1). 
Discussion of how judges approach the task of sentencing and how we understand 
judicial pronouncements in their published sentencing decisions is largely absent from the 
sentencing literature. As Mackenzie has observed, ‘there have been few attempts 
worldwide to discern judicial methodology by interviewing judges’ and ‘discussion of these 
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issues is often limited to senior judges’, or is ‘not necessarily representative of the range of 
views within the judiciary’ (2005: 2). Sentencing involves some of the most important 
decisions in society: it is the moment in the criminal justice process when ‘not only must 
justice be done; it must also be seen to be done’ (R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy 
[1924] 1 KB 256). Yet, there is little in the way of research into judicial attitudes and 
perceptions of sentencing (Mackenzie, 2005: 3). While sentencing is a quintessential 
exercise of discretion, that discretion is also bounded by sentencing legislation and 
guidelines, principles established by appellate decisions, and the submissions made by the 
prosecution and defence as to how the various sentencing factors should apply in the 
instant case. In their sentencing decisions, judges must respond to the arguments put to 
them, especially the defendant’s plea in mitigation, as well as paying due regard to 
authorities, taking into account victim impact statements, weighing aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and arriving at a final disposition.    
Of the few studies that do examine judicial reasoning and decision-making in formal 
published reasons in cases of homicide (see Burton, 2003; Hall et al., 2015; Horder and Fitz-
Gibbon, 2015; Kirby, 1999), there has been a tendency to focus only on appellate court 
decisions. A recent example can be found in a study by Horder and Fitz-Gibbon in which 
they undertook an examination of the small number of appellate decisions on sentencing in 
cases raising issues of provocation by infidelity, both before and after the 2009 reforms in 
England and Wales. In assessing the impact of the English homicide law reforms, Horder and 
Fitz-Gibbon conclude that the reforms ‘have not been followed in spirit’ by the English 
courts in their approach to sentencing for murder post-2009, a failing they attribute in part 
to the policy underlying the 2003 sentencing legislation and guidance governing minimum 
starting points for murder in England and Wales (2015: 21; cf Howe, 2014). While we agree 
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it is important to approach the question of whether reform has achieved meaningful change 
in practice through a consideration of ‘not only the substantive law of homicide, but also 
sentencing legislation and guidance’ (Horder and Fitz-Gibbon, 2015: 21), we go a step 
further than Horder and Fitz-Gibbon and examine first instance sentencing decisions rather 
than only appellate decisions. As discussed below, if we had restricted our focus to Victorian 
Court of Appeal decisions post-legislative reform, we might have reached the same 
conclusion as Horder and Fitz-Gibbon. However, systematic empirical analysis of all 
sentencing judgments after the abolition of provocation reveals rather a different picture. 
Initially, we undertook a systematic content analysis of the 76 sentencing and appeal 
judgments (Bohours and Daly, 2007). We used the method of content analysis because it is 
one that Hall and Wright propose ‘resembles the classic scholarly exercise of reading a 
collection of cases, finding common threads that link the opinions, and commenting on their 
significance’ (2008: 64). This method, they argue, ‘is more than a better way to read cases’. 
It ‘meets both the rigorous standards of social science’, enriching ‘our understanding of case 
law [and] creating a distinctively legal form of empiricism’ (Hall and Wright, 2008: 64, 66). 
The judgments were entered into NVivo and coded according to a coding scheme to record 
defined elements of each case. We coded for judicial statements concerning explicit 
provocation (where the language and concept of provocation was discussed explicitly); 
implicit provocation (where language and/or concepts of loss of control were discussed 
without explicit reference to the words ‘provocation’ or ‘provoked’); infidelity and sexual 
jealousy; men’s anger and rage; and mutual violence between the defendant and victim. By 
way of contrast, we also coded statements concerning women’s rights, autonomy and 
equality. In each case we noted whether these statements were made in response to 
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arguments raised by the prosecution or defence, or whether the language of provocation or 
women’s rights appeared to have been introduced by the judge of his or her own initiative. 
The coded extracts relating to each kind of statement were then analysed using 
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis 'stresses the constitutive role of discourse in legal 
activities and the ways in which language constructs versions of reality, the rhetorical 
consequences of which may have serious implications for social justice' (MacMartin and 
Woods, 2005: 141). For example, we identified whether the judge endorsed or rejected 
provocation-related arguments put by the defence and the language and discursive devices 
they used to do so, whether they revealed any apparent hostility to the reforms, or 
whether, conversely, they appeared positively to endorse the spirit of the reforms and how 
they did so. In the course of the analysis, we checked back against the full judgments in 
many instances to ensure we understood the context for the coded comments and were not 
misrepresenting judicial attitudes. As such, our focus was on the ways in which judicial 
descriptions are both situated and rhetorical; that is, they are ‘embedded in a larger 
discussion of the judge’s reasons for sentence, which collective serve to argue that the 
penalty is appropriate in this case’ (MacMartin and Wood, 2005: 141), and also ‘constructed 
from words, figures of speech, descriptions, narratives, and so on, which can be studied in 
order to understand how the discourse is built to perform certain actions’ (MacMartin and 
Wood, 2005: 141).  
 We also looked for any patterns of gender difference between judges, or any judges 
whose sentencing remarks stood out as being noticeably different from those of their 
colleagues. The sentencing dataset included four different women judges and 18 different 
male judges, some of whom gave multiple sentences (see Tables 1 and 2).  Appeals are 
heard by a bench of three judges. The 15 appeals were heard by a total of 15 men and five 
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women judges. Due to promotions and the practice of trial judges sitting occasionally as 
Acting Justices of Appeal, there was some overlap between the two groups, with seven men 
and two women judges sitting both at first instance and on appeals.  
 
The Victorian Sentencing Manual 
The Judicial College of Victoria (JCV) provides judicial education and keeps judicial officers 
abreast of developments in law and related social issues. It publishes a number of judicial 
reference manuals, including a Search Warrants Manual, Victorian Criminal Proceedings 
Manual, Sexual Assault Manual, Uniform Evidence Manual, and the Victorian Sentencing 
Manual. These publications are produced under the guidance of Judicial Editorial 
Committees, based on case law of the Victorian Court of Appeal, and updated regularly. 
However updates may consist of a listing of recent Court of Appeal decisions rather than 
amendments to the text of the relevant sections. The aims of the Victorian Sentencing 
Manual are expressed in its Introduction to be to ‘promote consistency of approach by 
sentencers in their exercise of their discretion’, to provide ready access to the law to 
sentencers whilst in court, and to provide guidance in interpreting and assessing the weight 
of factual matters relevant to the instant case (JCV, 2014: section 1).  
In relation to the issue of provocation in sentencing, the Victorian Sentencing 
Manual is not up to date and generally does not reflect on the potential impact of the 
abolition of the partial defence of provocation on sentencing.  Its general statement on 
provocation in sentencing reads: 
Provocative conduct by the victim will generally be a relevant consideration when 
assessing offence seriousness, primarily by offering a mitigatory explanation for the 
offending. In so doing it may reduce the moral culpability of the offender, and also 
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have an impact on the purposes of sentence. … While provocative conduct may in 
some circumstances reflect negatively upon the character of the victim, perhaps 
even taking him or her out of the class of ‘innocent victims’, it is not generally to be 
regarded as reducing the significance of any harm suffered by the victim (JCV, 2014: 
section 9.12). 
While this statement applies generally to sentencing for any offence and might be seen as 
unexceptionable, no authority is cited for it, and there is no reference to or flagging of the 
fact that different considerations might apply in the homicide context. Under the sub-
heading ‘Recent cases alert’, there is a reference to ‘Effect of provocation in murder 
sentencing’, but the case reference is to R v. Tran (2008), a pre-abolition case. There is no 
reference to the Court of Appeal’s post-abolition decisions. 
From a doctrinal point of view, the Tran case arguably offers no assistance to a post-
abolition sentencing judge, both because it is a pre-abolition case, and because, while the 
Crown raised the question of whether provocative conduct by one member of a group could 
be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing the defendant for the murder of another 
member of the group, the Court did not find it necessary to decide the issue. Its inclusion is 
of some concern, however, both because the allegedly provocative conduct consisted of 
‘mere words’4 (the defendant engaged in a heated argument with his wife during which she 
accused him of stealing money and insulted him with a Vietnamese epithet indicating 
stupidity) which would have come nowhere near the threshold for provocation had she 
been the victim of his homicidal rage, and because of the implication that pre-abolition 
thinking about sentencing, and particularly the much lower threshold for provocative 
conduct at that stage, continues to be relevant to post-abolition cases.          
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Two further sections of the Victorian Sentencing Manual deal specifically with 
provocation in homicide cases. The first of these is ‘Provocation at sentence and 
provocation manslaughter’ (JCV, 2014: section 9.12.1). This section was last updated in June 
2005. It refers to the partial defence of provocation and makes no reference to its abolition. 
It cites pre-abolition case law to the effect, as indicated in the Tran case, that when 
provocation is being considered at the sentencing stage, it is taken more broadly than the 
kind of provocation required to meet the requirements of the partial defence of 
provocation. In other words the kind of ‘provocation’ which may be taken into account in 
sentencing is provocation in its ordinary meaning rather than in its specialised legal meaning 
(R v. Okutgen, 1982, per Starke J; R v. Aboujaber, 1997, per Ormiston J). This point is 
reinforced in a subsequent section titled ‘Nature of provocation’ (JCV, 2014: section 9.12.2), 
which states that a defendant’s loss of self-control in response to some form of provocation 
will have the greatest impact on sentence, but this may not always be a necessary factor. It 
cites another pre-abolition decision, R v. Kelly (2000), in which Chernov JA simply 
emphasised the need for proximity between the provocation and the response. That is, 
provocation may be taken into account if there are words or acts which incited or induced 
the defendant to respond almost immediately while in an agitated or angry state. 
The sub-section titled ‘Provocation and murder’ (JCV, 2014: section 9.12.1.1) does 
mention the abolition of the partial defence of provocation. However its main point is to 
note that despite this, ‘Where provocation is not available as a defence to murder, the 
existence of provocative acts will still be relevant to the task of the sentencing judge in 
sentencing the offender for murder’ – again citing pre-abolition case law (R v. Foley, 1999). 
It goes on to refer to the ‘discussion of possible approaches to post-abolition provocation 
murder’ in the Provocation in Sentencing research paper discussed above (Stewart and 
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Freiberg, 2009), but it is clear that nothing in the Victorian Sentencing Manual is consistent 
with or endorses Stewart and Freiberg’s proposals as to how arguments about provocation 
should be assessed in the post-abolition sentencing process. 
Other relevant sections of the Victorian Sentencing Manual include ‘Provocation 
reducing murder to manslaughter’ and ‘Relationship killings’ (sections 27.6.8.1, 26.6.7). The 
former notes the abolition of the partial defence of provocation but the section relates to 
the few cases in which it may still apply because the offence occurred before 22 November 
2005. The latter notes that killing in the context of a relationship is an aggravating factor, 
calling for a sentencing response in terms of community condemnation and general 
deterrence. Again, however, this section was last updated on 2 November 2005, hence all 
authorities cited are pre-reform cases. 
In summary, if one were only to read the Victorian Sentencing Manual, one would 
barely grasp that the partial defence of provocation has been abolished in Victoria, and 
would certainly not gain the impression that this might have had any effect on the approach 
to sentencing. In Horder and Fitz-Gibbon’s words, the Victorian Sentencing Manual treats 
‘the change in the substantive law as a purely “technical” one, relevant only to the legal 
grounds on which murder may or may not be reduced to manslaughter’ (2015: 2). It does 
not contemplate whether ‘the spirit of the reforms’ may demand ‘a more general shift in 
moral thinking concerning the relative seriousness of murders’ committed in response to 
alleged provocation (Horder and Fitz-Gibbon, 2015: 3).   
 
The Court of Appeal 
Although, as noted above, there were 15 appeals in the domestic homicide cases in our 
post-provocation sentencing database, most of those appeals related to issues other than 
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provocation, such as the contested admission of certain evidence at trial, the judge’s alleged 
failure to take sufficient account of the defendant’s psychological state, or, in DPP appeals, 
the alleged leniency of the sentence given the nature of the offending. Only two cases dealt 
directly with the question of provocation as a mitigating factor in sentencing.    
The leading case is Felicite v. R (2011), in which the defendant had sought treatment 
for difficulties controlling his anger and had previously made threats to his wife. When she 
announced at a marriage counselling session that she intended to leave him to pursue a 
relationship with another man, he at first responded calmly. However the next day, he 
stabbed her to death in a frenzied attack with two kitchen knives.  The Court of Appeal 
(Redlich JA, with whom Harper JA and Robson AJA agreed) expressed the view (at para. 21) 
that:  
The existence of great emotional strain within a domestic or spousal relationship 
which plays upon the offender’s emotional susceptibilities and results in a 
spontaneous act may bear upon the offender’s degree of criminality.  
Accordingly, 
a murder committed on the spur of the moment in a domestic environment as a 
consequence of a volatile mixture of emotions, whether or not in response to what 
was previously recognised as provocation in law, may attract a lesser sentence.   
This clearly does not draw the kind of distinction Stewart and Freiberg called for. On the 
contrary, it seems to revive the problematic aspects of provocation in terms of excusing 
men’s jealous and controlling violence against women, and to give them broader scope at 
the sentencing stage. 
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At the same time, however, the court in Felicte stressed that ‘murders that occur in 
such circumstances are not to be approached as if they fall into a discrete and less serious 
category of the offence’ (at para. 19): 
The taking of a domestic partner’s life undermines the foundations of personal 
relationships and family trust upon which our society rests.  The sentence must 
reflect both the sanctity of human life and societies’ [sic] abhorrence of violence 
towards vulnerable and trusting partners who could legitimately have expected the 
offender to be the protector, not the perpetrator of violent abuse.  An outburst of 
homicidal rage in such contexts is totally unacceptable.  The community expectation 
is that the punishment assigned to such conduct must be condign so as to denounce 
in the strongest terms the abhorrent nature of domestic murder and to deter others 
from taking a similar course.  Accordingly the principles of general deterrence, 
denunciation and just punishment will ordinarily be given primacy in sentencing for 
the murder of a partner in a domestic setting even where there are present, 
circumstances of provocation or great emotional stress (para. 22, footnotes 
omitted).  
These two paragraphs appear to reflect the kind of mixed messages on ‘relationship killings’ 
found in the Victorian Sentencing Manual. On the one hand, killing within a relationship may 
be mitigated by ‘provocative’ words or conduct acting on emotional susceptibilities. On the 
other hand, killing a domestic partner is considered an aggravating factor which should be 
strongly condemned. The court went on to specify that whether a reduction in sentence was 
available would depend upon the circumstances of each individual case (at para. 36), and 
they also agreed with the trial judge that the instant case was not one in which the sentence 
should be mitigated for this reason.  
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The second post-abolition Court of Appeal decision of relevance is McPhee v. R 
(2014). Mr and Mrs McPhee had long-standing marital difficulties and were making 
arrangements to separate. There was evidence of his possessiveness, jealousy and 
harassment of her, and one evening, after she told him she no longer trusted or loved him, 
he claimed to have ‘snapped’ and stabbed her to death. He pleaded guilty to murder and 
was given a sentence of 20 years with a non-parole period of 16 years. He successfully 
appealed against this sentence. The Court of Appeal quoted the above two paragraphs from 
Felicite but seemed to be paying only lip service to the second paragraph, as they 
considered that the offence fell within the lowest category of seriousness of the offence of 
murder, and at the lower end of that category (McPhee, 2014: para. 14). Without singling 
out particular factors, they suggested that the trial judge had possibly misjudged the 
objective gravity of the offence by giving insufficient weight to the mitigating factors in the 
case, and failing to take into account the absence of aggravating factors that would elevate 
the offending to a more serious category (at para. 14). This hardly reflects an ‘abhorrence of 
violence towards vulnerable and trusting partners’.  
Arguably, in its judgments in Felicite and McPhee the Victorian Court of Appeal has 
not embraced the feminist spirit of the reforms, but has effectively invited defendants in 
domestic homicide cases to continue to deploy gendered provocation narratives in an effort 
to reduce their sentences. This is consistent with similarly disappointing case law from the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal following the reforms to provocation in that jurisdiction 
(Horder and Fitz-Gibbon, 2015). Freiberg, Gelb and Stewart (2015) note that even prior to 
the abolition of the partial defence of provocation, some trial judges had been reluctant to 
put the defence to the jury in domestic homicide cases, but had been directed to do so by 
the Court of Appeal. The Felicite and McPhee decisions seem consistent with the Court of 
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Appeal’s earlier disposition. However, it appears that in practice, defendants have not had 
much success in persuading trial judges (as opposed to juries) that they should have the 
benefit of this factor in reducing their sentences. 
 
Trial judges’ attitudes  
Explicit provocation  
The language of provocation was raised explicitly in 13 of the sentencing judgments, but in 
nine of these cases it was mentioned by the judge only to be summarily dismissed. In three 
of those nine cases, any form of provocation was specifically not established in 
circumstances in which there were no witnesses to the killing and the evidential record was 
scanty.  In DPP v. Lam (2007: para. 5), Justice Bernard Teague noted: 
As to what passed between you that night, we have only your account to the police 
to add to the forensic picture. What seems to have been troubling you most was her 
silence in the face of your pressure to know more about the other man. As to 
matters other than a persistent silence on her part, you said to the police only that 
at one stage she slapped you. You did not claim to have lost self-control as a result of 
the slap or otherwise. The notion of there having been the kind of provocation that 
could cause an ordinary man to lose self-control is quite unsupportable. 
It is interesting that Teague J here refers to the meaning of provocation as embodied in the 
abolished partial defence (‘the kind of provocation that could cause an ordinary man to lose 
self-control’) rather than any broader conception, but beyond that provocation is present 
only by its absence. Similarly, in R v. Chalmers (2009: para. 49), Justice Robert Osborn 
observed that: ‘the fact that no motive has been proven for the killing does not assist you, 
because there is no apparent specific trigger for your actions or explanation by way of 
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provocation or other psychological mechanism. On the evidence this was a cold-blooded 
killing’. And in Mocenigo (2012: para. 10), Justice Lex Lasry stated: ‘I am not able to say 
whether provocation played any part in your resorting to fatal violence.  On such evidence 
as there is, there is nothing mitigating about the circumstances in which the jury have found 
that Ms Hall died’. In two of the nine cases, R v. Kelly (2012) and R v. Wentholt (2013), the 
defendant had formed alcohol-fuelled delusions that the victim had been having an affair 
with his partner or was interested in his girlfriend, respectively. Each judge noted in passing 
that there was no suggestion that the attacks on the victims had been provoked (Kelly, 
2012: para. 16; Wenholt, 2013: para. 21). In the remaining four of the nine cases, R v. Baxter 
(2009), R v. Wilson (2011), R v. Delich (2013) and R v. Cook (2015), the judge mentioned the 
lack of provocation rhetorically to emphasise the senseless nature of the killing, for 
example: ‘It is a pointless, unprovoked, dreadful murder of a woman who was doing no 
more than enjoying her life’ (Wilson, 2011: para. 21); ‘She was defenceless and had done 
nothing to provoke your extraordinarily vicious attack’ (Baxter, 2009: para. 2).   
  By contrast, in R v. Neacsu (2012), the defendant killed his wife’s new partner and 
sought to rely by way of mitigation on the allegedly provocative actions of his wife in taking 
up with the new partner and refusing to tell the defendant where and with whom she was 
living. Justice Betty King accepted that (at para. 43):  
the fact that a crime is a crime of passion can mitigate, to a limited extent, the 
gravity of the offence. What that means is that it may demonstrate that the offence 
was not in any way premeditated, pre-planned, but came about as a loss of self 
control, due to circumstances that were not of your making.   
But, she continued (at para. 43):  
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Here you have chosen to pursue the issue of whom your wife was living with, and 
decided to pursue it whilst armed with a knife ...  Accordingly, whilst this may be a 
crime of anger or rage, I do not accept that it was a crime of passion in the ordinary 
mitigatory sense. 
Similarly, in a second case decided by a woman judge, McPhee (2013), Justice Elizabeth 
Curtain, gave short shrift to the defendant’s claim that his wife must have said something to 
cause him to ‘see red’, grab a knife and stab her to death. On her view of the evidence (at 
para. 24): 
Although your actions were unpremeditated and spontaneous, you clearly acted out 
of anger and, no doubt, alcohol played its part. It was not news to you that your wife 
wanted a separation, although you may not have wanted one. You went along with 
the idea of it and, indeed, up until that day, had acted reasonably and somewhat 
responsibly in working on your marital issues and working towards a trial separation. 
You had spent that afternoon with your wife convivially enjoying each other’s 
company and, it seems, to a point, discussing the state of your marriage without 
rancour. Your wife did nothing to provoke you, although you say she must have said 
something. She was defenceless and must have been taken utterly by surprise by 
your attack. She was doing no more than lying on the couch in the sanctuary of her 
own home. 
Only in one case, R v. Budimir (2013), another killing of a wife’s new partner, did the 
judge, Justice Geoffrey Nettle, ‘recognise’ (at para. 41) that the defendant was ‘in some 
sense, provoked by the deceased’s association with’ his wife, ‘and by the deceitful way in 
which both he and she had treated [the defendant] concerning the affair’. He stated (at 
para. 55), in line with the Court of Appeal in Felicite: 
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I accept that your mental state at the time of the killing was to some extent 
compromised by the effects of your wife’s infidelity, the consequent breakdown in 
your marriage and the resultant destruction of the family life which you valued 
greatly. … On that basis, I find that your capacity to make rational judgments at the 
time of the killing was to some extent affected and, to that extent, that the level of 
your moral culpability is reduced. But the reduction is not large. There is no longer 
much scope for the recognition of a reduction in moral culpability in crimes resulting 
from idiosyncratic (even if, in some quarters, still entrenched) psycho-social attitudes 
to the rights and roles of women.  
In the event, on the facts of the case, including the brutality of the murder on the one hand, 
and psychological evidence on the other, the provocation issue appears to have had little or 
no influence on the sentence imposed. 
 In the final case in which the defendant made an explicit appeal to provocation as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing, R v. Freeman (2015), the alleged provocation did not stem 
from the defendant’s sexual jealousy or desire to control his partner or prevent her from 
leaving him. The defendant and victim had been having sex, when the victim suddenly asked 
‘what’s it like fucking a 13-year-old?’ (at para. 1). The defendant had been sexually abused 
as a child, and claimed to have been so upset by this (apparently baseless) allegation that he 
had himself sexually abused a child that he left the room, grabbed a knife from the kitchen 
and stabbed the victim once in the neck. He was found guilty of murder by a jury, and at the 
sentencing stage, Justice Michael Croucher was required to decide the disputed questions of 
whether the defendant had been provoked to act as he did, and if so, what effect that 
would have on the sentence to be imposed. 
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 In relation to the first question, Croucher J was satisfied that the defendant had lost 
control as a result of the victim’s remark, which he considered to be ‘provocative in nature’ 
and also ‘had a particular sting for him’ because of his history of sexual abuse (at para. 31). 
The judge was further satisfied that the defendant had stabbed the victim while in a state of 
loss of control. As to the second question, Croucher J noted that both parties had submitted 
that provocation could be a mitigating factor in sentencing for murder, and he relied on the 
authorities cited by the Crown in considering how it ought to be taken into account. 
Strangely (perhaps in reliance on the Victorian Sentencing Manual), the Crown appears not 
to have cited the passages from the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in Felicite discussed 
above. Rather, they referred to a decision of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal 
following the abolition of the defence of provocation in that State, and to Stewart and 
Freiberg’s proposal (2008, 2009) that the test ought to be whether the defendant had a 
justifiable sense of being wronged. The Tasmanian decision, Tyne v. Tasmania (2005) 15 Tas 
R 221, stood for the propositions that sentencing for murder mitigated by provocation 
should not be in line with sentencing in previous manslaughter by provocation cases; that 
the defendant bears the onus of proving provocation as a mitigating factor; and to establish 
mitigation, it is not necessary to show that an ordinary person would have lost self-control 
in the same circumstances (Freeman, 2015: paras 36-37). 
 In the event, Croucher J did not need to decide between the various possible tests 
for provocation since he was satisfied all of them were met: the defendant had acted under 
an actual loss of self-control, the victim’s words were capable of causing an ordinary person 
with the defendant’s history of sexual abuse to lose self-control, and the words were such 
as to cause the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being wronged (at para. 40). As a 
result, he found that the defendant’s moral culpability was reduced, which should in turn 
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result in a lower sentence (at para. 41). At this point Croucher J did refer to the facts of 
Felicite, and considered that the provocation faced by the defendant in this case was likely 
to be more stinging and was more likely to cause an ordinary person to lose self-control 
than one partner telling another of past infidelity or that their relationship was over (at 
para. 89). Nevertheless, taking all the sentencing factors into account, the sentence he 
imposed was squarely within the range of murder sentences found in our study (see Table 
1), and the total sentence was identical to that in Felicite, with only a lower non-parole 
period of 15 rather than 16 years.  
 The Freeman case arguably illustrates Stewart and Freiberg’s distinction between 
cases in which a defendant simply became enraged and claimed to have lost control in 
response to a partner’s assertion of autonomy (as in Felicite and Budimir), and cases in 
which the defendant has a justifiable sense of being wronged, judged by reference to both 
their particular circumstances and equality principles. Here, the defendant’s sense of being 
wronged was justifiable both because of his past sexual abuse and because recognition of 
the victim’s words as provocative would not diminish her equality or her right to make 
choices about her own life. Regrettably, however, the decision was expressed in the old 
language of provocation rather than in these alternative terms, and contains unfortunate 
echoes of victim-blaming and the notion that ‘mere words’ might cause ordinary men to 
lose control and kill.                 
 
Implicit provocation 
An implicit provocation argument, suggesting that the defendant had lost control and killed 
the victim as a result of some kind of provocative act on her part, was raised in 15 
sentencing cases. However the argument of loss of control was accepted by the judge in 
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only three of these cases, and in two of them (R v. Diver, 2008; R v. Foster, 2009) it was 
closely associated with evidence that the defendant was in some kind of abnormal 
psychological state. In the third case, R v. Brooks (2008), there were no direct witnesses to 
the killing and the defendant had no real recollection of what had occurred. There was 
evidence that the defendant and victim had been arguing, and the victim had died from a 
single stab wound. Justice Paul Coghlan concluded (at para. 18): 
It follows from that analysis of the evidence that the events which led to the murder 
were brief, no longer than minutes. In that sense I find that the murder occurred in 
circumstances of a sudden loss of self-control. What triggered the events is 
unknown, and unless at some stage your recollection improves, it will never be 
known.    
This imputation of loss of control seems gratuitous, given that all the judge needed to say 
was that he was satisfied the killing was unpremeditated. There appears to be some 
stereotypical view about men’s killing of domestic partners operating here, in that a brief 
argument resulting in death must necessarily have involved some form of provocation by 
the victim and a corresponding loss of control by the defendant. But such stereotypes do 
not appear to have been shared by other members of the court. 
In the remaining 12 cases, the implicit provocation argument was rejected by the 
judge. In six of these cases, the judge explicitly or implicitly rejected the notion that the 
defendant had experienced a sudden loss of control. For example, in R v. Piper (2008), 
Justice Robert Osborn maintained (at para. 41): 
your conduct involved protracted, brutal and deliberate violence. You were not 
satisfied with the initial manual strangulation which you inflicted, but persisted in 
the deliberate murder of Ms Chow with a ligature. I do not accept that you simply 
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‘snapped’ as your counsel submitted, if that term is meant to imply that what 
occurred was some momentary loss of control. This was an attack of sustained and 
deliberate viciousness. 
In R v. Mahoney (2009), Justice Elizabeth Hollingworth, commenting on the defendant’s 
history of violence towards the victim prior to killing her, noted (at para. 20):  
This was not an isolated incident. Your counsel quite properly conceded that you had 
a history of violence towards Ms Tilley. Whilst I am mindful of the need not to 
sentence you for past conduct for which you have not been charged, the fact is that 
your behaviour cannot be dismissed as simply being out of character or arising from 
a spontaneous eruption of emotion. 
In R v. Singh (2015), the defendant had recently discovered his wife’s relationship with 
another man, and stabbed her to death in her sleep. Justice Lex Lasry was unimpressed by 
the defendant’s claim to have had ‘some kind of black out’ around the time of the attack 
and not to be able to recall the details of what had occurred. He expressed the view (at 
para. 35) that the defendant’s actions in killing his wife constituted an exercise of control to 
ensure she did not share her life with anyone else and added (at para. 41): 
Domestic violence is rightly the subject of significant public interest after decades of 
it being ignored or trivialised. This is an extreme example of domestic violence. 
Nikita Chawla did nothing whatsoever to in any way contribute to what you did to 
her. Whilst it appears that you were acting spontaneously, in my opinion you acted 
with some degree of vengeance and control.  
In the other six cases, the judge, while accepting that the defendant’s actions had 
been spontaneous, unplanned or unpremeditated, rejected the notion that the victim had 
done anything to provoke him to lose self-control.  For example in R v. Bayram (2011), 
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Justice Betty King found that the defendant’s killing of his wife had resulted from an 
argument about the division of property following their impending separation, and that he 
had ‘severely overreacted to her desire for the fair and equitable sharing of the joint assets’ 
(at para. 10). In other words, she constructed the wife as reasonable rather than 
provocative and the defendant as unreasonable rather than provoked.  Likewise, in Azizi 
(2010), King J was satisfied that the defendant’s wife, while she had been generally 
expressing her desire to leave the marriage, had not done anything to cause the defendant 
to lose control and attack her (at para. 43). Following the retrial in Azizi (2013), Justice 
Stephen Kaye likewise considered that the defendant’s actions were an unreasonable 
reaction to his wife’s assertion of her rights, but he did find that the defendant had lost 
control of his emotions and killed her in a fit of uncontrollable rage (at para. 32). By 
contrast, King J did not characterise Azizi as having lost control, and more generally avoided 
the use of language associated with or suggestive of provocation. 
 
Infidelity and sexual jealousy 
Overall there were 21 cases which raised issues of (alleged) infidelity or sexual jealousy, 
including seven cases in which the defendant killed a male rival, but as the discussion above 
indicates, this was almost never accepted as a sufficient basis on which to found an 
argument for mitigation of sentence due to provocation/loss of control. The only two cases 
in which such an argument succeeded were Budimir (2013), discussed above under ‘explicit 
provocation’, and Foster (2009), discussed above under ‘implicit provocation’, but in which 
the defendant’s mental illness was the most salient factor. Of more note in these cases were 
statements made by two of the women judges condemning the defendants’ extreme 
reactions to their partners’ relationships – real or imagined – with other men. Justice Betty 
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King’s comments in Neascu (2013) were noted above.  In R v. Ahmadi (2013), Justice 
Elizabeth Curtain stated (at para. 25):  
…you killed your wife, you say by strangling her, apparently by pulling a cord around 
her neck until she did not move, which must have been a sustained act, requiring 
significant pressure, and all because she told you she was going away with another 
man. … It is in these circumstances that the crime here committed is properly to be 
regarded as a significant example of the crime of manslaughter.  
Curtain J’s remarks in R v. West (2013) were equally forthright in response to a defendant 
who had killed a man who was unknown to him but who was one of two male friends who 
had been staying with the defendant’s ex-girlfriend. In the days leading up to the event, the 
defendant had become increasingly jealous of the two men and had repeatedly texted, 
called and emailed his ex-girlfriend saying that he wanted to see her, expressing animosity 
towards the two male friends and accusing her of using drugs. In sentencing the defendant, 
Curtain J said she was satisfied that he was ‘driven by uncontrollable rage and jealousy’ (at 
para. 38) and described his act in killing the deceased as ‘truly a gratuitous act of extreme 
violence’, and the death as ‘as pointless and senseless a death as one could imagine’ (at 
para. 32).  
These comments by women judges may be contrasted with the rather more limited 
remarks about (alleged) infidelity or sexual jealousy in the cases heard by male judges. In R 
v. Baxter (2009), Justice John Forrest condemned the defendant’s belief that his wife was 
having an affair as a form of controlling behaviour (at para. 13). However in two other cases, 
Singh (2010) and Felicite (2010), he made no further comment on the defendant’s sexual 
jealousy, and Justice Terence Forrest likewise made no further comment in Wentholt (2013), 
even though in both the Singh and Wentholt cases the defendant’s jealousy was based on 
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entirely imagined suspicions. In R v. Daing (2015: para. 29), T Forrest J made a fairly 
conventional remark about the need to deter ‘inadequate’ and jealous men from terrorising 
their weaker female partners. In Kelly (2012: para. 19), Justice Stephen Kaye said he was 
satisfied that the defendant’s assault on the male victim ‘was not premeditated; rather it 
was product of the suspicion which dawned on you, when you were intoxicated, that [the 
victim] was having an affair with your girlfriend’. But while he was concerned to ensure that 
the sentence imposed was ‘of sufficient severity…to constitute a clear message to the 
community that this Court will not tolerate drunken violence of the kind in which you 
indulged in this case’ (at para. 50), he did not see fit to express equal intolerance of violence 
driven by possessive jealousy.  
 
Men’s anger and rage 
Anger or rage, without more, and whether or not in some way provoked or precipitated by 
the victim, was never accepted as an excuse or justification for killing or a factor that might 
reduce the defendant’s moral culpability. Indeed, killings motivated by anger or rage were 
universally condemned. In six cases, the judge rejected the defendant’s explanation for his 
actions and found instead that he had acted out of anger or rage.  For example, in R v. 
Pennisi (2008), Justice David Harper considered that the killing of the victim had been a 
result of the defendant’s anger rather than an accident as the defendant claimed (at para. 
5).  In Baxter (2009), Justice John Forrest stated (at para. 36):   
Whilst I accept that you were in a low mood and had a degree of frustration about 
your wife’s failure to respond to your questions about the phone records, none of 
this provides even a glimmer of an explanation for your behaviour.  I think that your 
actions flowed not only from your rage about your wife’s affair, but more 
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importantly from the fact that you could not control the unfolding of the impending 
separation. 
In Neacsu (2012), as noted above, Justice Betty King stated that the killing was ‘a crime of 
anger or rage’ rather than ‘a crime of passion in the ordinary mitigatory sense’ (at para. 38). 
And in McPhee (2013) Justice Elizabeth Curtain  considered that ‘Your explanation that you 
“snapped” masks the reality that you acted out of anger when you stabbed your wife not 
once but twice, and in the face of her cries for you to stop’ (at para. 25). 
Moreover, women judges in particular suggested that anger was something men 
needed to learn to control. In two cases, R v. West (2013: para. 41) and R v. Drummond 
(2012: para. 29), Curtain J asserted that the defendant’s inability to control his anger made 
him an ongoing danger to the community and affected his prospects of rehabilitation (a 
similar point was made by a male judge, Forrest J, in Felicite, 2010: para. 25), while in R v. 
Carolus (2011: para. 54), Justice Elizabeth Hollingworth expressed the view that although 
the defendant had begun to address his underlying behavioural problems, ‘it is likely to take 
a lot more work to address your long history of alcohol abuse and anger management’.  In R 
v. Mulhall (2012), King J noted the defendant had previously been served with an 
intervention order and faced criminal charges for assaults on the victim, and stated that this 
history should have meant he took more care to exercise control and not put himself in a 
position to lose his temper (at para. 32).  On this view, men’s anger and rage (and 
consequently violence) are seen as avoidable. Far from victim-blaming, these judges are 
careful to hold angry and violent men to account. Indeed, King J also held the defendant in 
Azizi (2010) to account for a further expression of anger (at para. 44): 
her death clearly resulted because of your belief that, you were entitled to dominate 
and dictate to your wife, what she could and could not do. Her growing resistance to 
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your dominance must well have angered you, an anger which I noted flashed in this 
court room when you were giving evidence, and I interrupted you to allow the 
interpreter to catch up with the translation. Your reaction to my stopping you, was 




There were six cases in which the defendant claimed that it was the victim who was the 
aggressor on the night of her death. In DPP v. Sherna (2009: paras. 18, 20), Justice David 
Beach accepted that the victim was controlling and domineering of the defendant, but 
found that the unhappy history of the relationship did not in any way justify or excuse the 
defendant’s killing of her.  In the other five cases, the judge rejected the defendant’s 
attempt at victim-blaming.  For example in R v. Middendorp (2010), the defensive homicide 
case, Justice David Byrne accepted that it ‘was a tempestuous even violent relationship’ (at 
para. 3). The jury’s finding of defensive homicide also meant that they had accepted that the 
defendant honestly believed he was at risk of death or serious injury when the victim came 
at him with a knife in her hand. However Byrne J emphasised the significant disparity in size 
and weight between the two of them, and stated (at paras 17 and 27): 
Jade Bowndes appears to have been a troubled young woman but she deserved 
better than the treatment you gave her on 1 September 2008. 
… 
Your history has been a history of violence towards a woman less strong than you.  
Notwithstanding your professed love for her, you subjected her to indignity.  You 
flouted the restraints imposed by the law to protect her. 
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Both Byrne J in Middendorp (at para. 10) and Justice Ross Robson in R v. Lubik (2011: para. 
65) commented on the disparity in size and strength between the defendant and the victim, 
and tended to use the language of chivalry, suggesting that these defendants should have 
been protecting their partners rather than attacking them. On the other hand, the woman 
judge who decided two of these cases, Justice Elizabeth Curtain, appeared to comment 
more from the victim’s perspective, affirming her right to feel safe in her own home 
(Drummond, 2012: para. 27) or her right to express a desire to leave the relationship 
(Ahmadi, 2013: para. 25). 
 
Positive endorsement of legislative reform 
The recent feminist judgment projects (Douglas et al., 2014a; Enright et al., 2017; Hunter et 
al., 2010; Stanchi et al., 2016; Women’s Court of Canada, 2006), and theorising around them 
(e.g. Davies, 2012; Fitz-Gibbon and Maher, 2015; Hunter, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015a, 
2015b; Hunter et al., forthcoming; Rackley, 2012), have identified a variety of practices 
which might be identified as ‘feminist’ judging. One key insight from these projects is that a 
feminist approach is at least as, if not more, likely to be found in judicial reasoning than in 
the outcome of a case. In her case study of a feminist judge on the Victorian Court of 
Appeal, for example, Hunter (2013) found that Justice Marcia Neave rarely arrived at a 
different result from her male or female colleagues, however in a number of cases it was 
possible to discern an identifiably feminist approach in her reasons for decision. As Hunter 
found, ‘[t]his was not usually due to a different legal analysis, but rather, in the application 
of the law to the facts, she told the story differently or expanded the law’s stock of common 
knowledge in a way that wrote the realities of women’s lives into the legal text’ (2013: 417). 
Secondly, while feminist judging might often involve creative or expansive interpretations of 
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legal texts (Hunter and Carr, 2010; Munro and Shah, 2010), it may also be found in the 
careful and ‘correct’ application of feminist-inspired legislative reforms, in circumstances in 
which judicial interpretation might otherwise undermine or fail to give full effect to the 
reforms. This has been observed, for example, in relation to anti-discrimination legislation 
(Douglas et al., 2014b: 33-34) and to legislation concerning the protection of vulnerable 
witnesses (Hunter, 2015a: 139). In our post-provocation sentencing dataset, we observed a 
similar phenomenon in cases concerning women’s autonomy and equality.  
There were 21 cases which raised issues of women’s autonomy and equality, in 
particular, women’s right to leave an unsatisfactory relationship, or men’s attempt to 
control them and prevent the exercise of their autonomy. Five of the 21 cases were decided 
by Justice Betty King, one was decided by Justice Elizabeth Curtain, four were decided by 
Justice Lex Lasry, and the remaining 11 were decided by eight different male judges. King J’s 
judgments were notably different from those of all her judicial colleagues, in that she went 
much further than the other judges in making explicit comments affirming women’s rights 
to autonomy and equality, in line with the reforms. In Azizi (2010: para. 18), she noted how 
the defendant’s wife wished to attend English classes and mix with the community, but this 
was prevented by him. Adopting the victim’s perspective and a broad understanding of 
family violence as ‘both of an emotional and physical nature’, King J found that the 
defendant had ‘treated her as a person lacking in individual rights, and a person that must 
do what she was told to do by you’. She further commented (at para. 20) that: 
It is clear that you were unable to accept that your wife had rights, which rights 
included the ability to leave you, if that was what she desired, to seek an 
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intervention order against you, if that was what she required and to be supported to 
live separately and apart, if that was what she required.  
In Bayram (2011: paras 5, 10), King J asserted that ‘[n]ot surprisingly, your wife wanted what 
she was entitled to, which was at least half of the assets acquired during the marriage’; ‘I 
therefore am prepared to act on the basis that that was the reason why your wife was 
killed, not that it was planned or premeditated but that you severely overreacted to her 
desire for a fair and equitable sharing of the joint assets’. King J made similar comments in 
Neacsu (2012: para. 43), asserting that: 
Our community, parliament and the courts have repeatedly said that women are not 
chattels, they are not something that is owned by a man, any man. Your wife was 
entitled to leave you. You may not have liked that, but she had the right to do so. 
She did not have to tell you where she was going, or if she was pursuing a 
relationship with another man. You had no right to know this, and you had no right 
to control what she did, but particularly you had no right to kill the man with whom 
she had formed a relationship because of your anger at being, as it was described, 
‘cuckolded’. Your relationship had been well and truly over and our society has 
moved forward and does not excuse any person on the basis of the crime being a 
‘crime of passion’. Provocation has been abolished in this State, and rightly so.  
In Mulhall (2012: para. 43), King J placed the case in the broader context of legal and 
extra-legal efforts to combat violence against women: 
Women are entitled to have domestic relationships with people that do not result in 
their death simply because their partner loses their temper or has too much to drink 
or a combination of cannabis and alcohol reduces their inhibitions. It is inexcusable 
and the law will do all it can to protect women from violent domestic partners. 
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Murder is a serious crime it carries the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The 
courts have consistently stated in relation to the crime of murder that killings of a 
domestic nature are no less serious than killings involving unrelated or stranger 
killings. Accordingly, whilst women are still dying at the hands of their domestic 
partners, the issue of general deterrence, in my view, remains very important. 
Most recently, in R v. Misalis (2014: paras. 72-73), King J commented that: 
She is another victim of domestic violence...  The courts and our community have said 
that women in particular must be protected from their partners.  We have white 
ribbon days, we have marches in our streets in support of women and their right to 
not be abused or have their lives taken by their partners, but still it continues.  
… 
She was killed in a savage and brutal manner.  …  She was in her home, according to 
the material, going about her business in an ordinary way, caring for you.  She should 
have been safe.  She probably felt safe.  Our community and our courts have 
consistently said, and more particularly in recent times, that women will be 
protected by the courts.  That they have the right to feel safe from serious injury or 
death being caused by their partners.   Your wife had the right to continue to enjoy 
her life, her future, her grandchildren, her retirement years, and you took all of 
those things from her.  She is the victim in this case, not you. 
King J’s comments can be compared to the lack of equivalent comments made by 
male judges. For instance, as noted earlier, Nettle J in Budimir (2013: para. 56) made only a 
very limited and abstract comment about outdated attitudes towards the roles and rights of 
women; Osborn J in Piper (2008: para. 59) made a limited comment about the taking of a 
partner’s life in the context of relationship breakdown; while Coghlan J. in Penglase (2011) 
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made no comment on the wife’s desire to leave the relationship. As discussed above, there 
was also a notable lack of comment by Forrest J in Singh, T Forrest J in Wentholt and Kaye J 
in Kelly on the defendant’s baseless sexual jealousy. Justice Michael Croucher in R v. 
Stoneham (2013: para. 51) did refer to women’s autonomy, but treated it simplistically. In 
his view, although there were ‘features of the relationship that suggested an attempt at 
controlling behaviour by Mr Stoneham … each time the relationship broke down’, the victim 
had successfully exercised her autonomy by ending the relationship. The fact that the 
defendant continued to engage in threatening behaviour towards her following the breakup 
and ultimately killed her were not, apparently, seen by the judge as attacks on her 
autonomy. Forrest J in Baxter (2009) made limited reference to how the deceased’s 
‘unhappiness’ with the relationship was due to the defendant’s controlling and domineering 
behaviour (at para. 7), as well as referring to the defendant’s ‘growing sense that you could 
not control [your wife’s] determination to leave’ (at para. 13) and ‘the fact that you could 
not control the unfolding of the impending separation’ (at para. 33).  
Only two male judges made explicit comments positively endorsing the reforms, and 
in both cases they appear to have been strongly influenced by King J in doing so. In Azizi 
(2013: para. 35), in sentencing the defendant after his retrial, Kaye J reiterated several of 
King J’s comments at the first trial, and included specific reference to some of her remarks 
which had been endorsed by the Court of Appeal. In Singh (2015), Lasry J concluded his 
judgment (at para. 40): 
What can be said about this murder as an extreme example of family violence that 
has not already been said in so many other cases? You murdered someone you 
professed to love. You murdered someone who had no capacity to defend herself 
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from the attack you launched against her. Despite feeling betrayed, you murdered 
someone who was completely entitled to end her marriage to you and form a 
relationship with someone else if she wished to. 
This statement is unlike anything in any of Lasry J’s other judgments, where he had 
sometimes dismissed the relevance of a history of violence (e.g. R v. Campbell, 2015), or 
stuck closely to the Court of Appeal’s statements in Felicite (e.g. R v. Browning, 2015: para. 
15). Moreover, it is so reminiscent of King J’s phrasing that it seems fair to conclude she was 
the inspiration for this adoption of a feminist perspective. 
 
Conclusion  
An examination of sentencing decisions by Victorian trial judges and judgments of the 
Victorian Court of Appeal following the abolition of the partial defence of provocation in 
that State reveals something of a mixed picture in relation to concerns about the 
reintroduction of problematic, gendered provocation narratives at the sentencing stage. In 
practice, it is clear that such narratives have had almost no effect on the sentencing of male 
defendants in domestic homicide cases.  Only five out of 61 sentencing judgments accepted 
an argument that the defendant had killed after having lost control in response to 
provocation and that his sentence should be mitigated as a result. Moreover, none of the 
successful appeals against sentence succeeded on this basis. Two of the five cases in which 
the provocation argument succeeded involved the victim’s alleged infidelity (Foster, 
Budimir), two involved triggering words or an argument not relating to infidelity (Diver, 
Freeman), and one involved an unknown trigger with the judge assuming provocation in the 
circumstances (Brooks). Foster and Budimir were the only two out of 21 cases raising issues 
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of alleged provocation by reason of infidelity or sexual jealousy in which this was held to 
constitute a mitigating factor in sentencing, albeit to only a minimal degree in both cases. In 
general, without articulating it as such, the approach of Victorian sentencing judges appears 
to have been consistent with Stewart and Freiberg’s proposal that alleged provocation 
should only operate as a mitigating factor in homicide sentencing when the defendant killed 
in response to a justifiable sense of being wronged, and they have either found that the 
defendant had no real sense of being wronged, or if he did, it was not justifiable. 
On the other hand, at the level of discourse, problematic provocation-type 
narratives continue to pervade post-provocation sentencing judgments. The Court of 
Appeal’s failure to articulate a new provocation standard along the lines suggested by 
Stewart and Freiberg, and its endorsement of a more permissive standard in Felicite and 
McPhee, has meant that defence counsel continue to be encouraged to raise provocation 
arguments in sentencing submissions. While a few male judges appear to retain some 
commitment to the notion of provocation by female partners as an excuse for male 
violence, in most instances sentencing judges have dealt with the issue of provocation only 
in response to pleas in mitigation. In a classic case of the return of the repressed, the 
language of ‘provocation’, ‘loss of control’, ‘crime of passion’, ‘emotional strain’, ‘volatile’ 
relationships and uncontrollable anger continues to be used and hence to be normalised in 
sentencing judgments, even as the defence arguments are rejected.  
The discursive effect of this repetition should not be overestimated, however. While 
this article has focused exclusively on the issue of provocation in sentencing, in fact, reading 
the sentencing judgments as a whole, that issue forms a relatively minor theme. By contrast, 
the dominant narratives that appear in the sentencing judgments in our database concern 
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lives blighted by alcohol and drug abuse, and claims that the defendant suffers from some 
form of psychiatric illness – a subject we propose to explore in a future article.          
At the same time, it is possible to discern in the sentencing judgments the 
emergence of new discourses which contest traditional provocation narratives and present 
alternative accounts of women’s lives and gender relations. This has occurred when judges 
in their sentencing remarks have gone beyond simple rejection of provocation arguments 
put by defendants and have positively denounced men’s violence towards their intimate 
partners or sexual rivals, condemned men’s extreme reactions to their partners’ or former 
partners’ relationships with other men, held men to account for their failure to control their 
anger and rage, and strongly asserted women’s rights to autonomy, equality and protection 
from male violence. It is notable that women judges have been more likely to do this than 
male judges, and further, that among the women judges, Justice Betty King stands out as 
the most vocal supporter of the homicide reforms, with her sentencing judgments providing 
a strong feminist counter-narrative to the victim-blaming narratives of pre-abolition 
provocation case law.  
This pattern is consistent with previous studies which suggest that while women 
judges often bring their gendered life experiences to the bench, not all women judges are or 
are willing to be feminists (see Hunter, 2015a). Nevertheless, what we see in some of the 
post-provocation sentencing judgments is the creation of alternative accounts of gender 
within law – something which earlier critiques of feminist law reform efforts may not have 
predicted, and which provides a more positive prognosis for such efforts.  Indeed, on the 
evidence of its first 10 years, it appears that the abolition of the partial defence of 
provocation in Victoria has largely met its feminist objectives. Men are no longer ‘getting 
away with murder’. Sentences generally reflect the seriousness of domestic homicides and 
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are only rarely mitigated by reference to claims of provocation. While problematic, victim-
blaming narratives still persist in sentencing discourse, they are almost always rejected in 
sentencing outcomes, and distinctly feminist counter-narratives have emerged to contest 
this space.      
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Table 1 - Cases of murder, manslaughter and defensive homicide by men who killed 
women, 2005-2015 (n = 51)  
Case citation and Judge Plea or Trial  Relationship between 





DPP v. Lam [2007] VSC 307  
Justice Bernard Teague 
Plea-murder Married 18 yrs/13 yrs 
R v. Brooks [2008] VSC 70  
Justice Paul Coghlan 
Trial-murder-FG 
murder 
Cohabiting 17 yrs/13 yrs 
R v. Blaauw [2008] VSC 129 
Justice John Forrest 
Plea-murder Married 11 yrs/7 yrs5 
R v. Ellis [2008] VSC 372 
Justice Paul Coghlan 
Trial-murder-FG- 
murder 
Separated 21 yrs/17 yrs 
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R v. Diver [2008] VSC 399 
Justice Paul Coghlan 
Plea-murder 
 
Cohabiting 17 yrs/14 yrs 
R v. Piper [2008] VSC 569 
Justice Robert Osborn  
Plea-murder (plus 2 
counts of armed 
robbery) 
Separated 19 yrs/15 yrs 
R v. Foster [2009] VSC 124  
Justice Robert Osborn 
Plea-murder Cohabiting  14 yrs/10 yrs 
R v. Baxter [2009] VSC 180  





Married 20 yrs/16 yrs 
R v.  Chalmers [2009] VSC 
251 
Justice Robert Osborn 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Cohabiting 22 yrs/18 yrs 
R v. Robinson [2010] VSC 10  
Justice Simon Whelan 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Separated Life/no parole 
R v. Dutton [2010] VSC 107 
Justice Betty King 
Plea-murder Work colleagues having 
an affair 
16 yrs/12 yrs 
R v. Azizi [2010] VSC 112 
Justice Betty King 














 R v. Felicite [2010] VSC 245 
Justice John Forrest 




Appeal vs sentence 
dismissed 
Married 19 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. Singh [2010] VSC 299 
Justice John Forrest 
Plea-murder Married 17 yrs/13.6 yrs 
R v. Caruso [2010] VSC 354  
Justice Betty King 






Married 18 yrs/13 yrs 
R v. Bayram [2011] VSC 10 
Justice Betty King 
 
Bayram v R [2012] VSCA 6 
Plea-murder  
 
Appeal vs sentence 
upheld 
Married 19 yrs/16 yrs 
 
16.6 yrs/ 13.6 yrs 
R v. Mamour [2011] VSC 113  
Justice Paul Coghlan 
Plea-murder Married 18 yrs/14 yrs 
R v. Wilson (Michael) [2011] 
VSC 123  
Justice Betty King  
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Cohabiting 22 yrs/18 yrs 
R v. Penglase [2011] VSC 
356 
Plea-murder Married 22 yrs/18 yrs 
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Justice Paul Coghlan 
R v. Weaven [2011] VSC 508 
Justice Mark Weinberg 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Cohabiting 22 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. Hopkins [2011] VSC 517 
Justice Betty King 





extension of time 
for leave to appeal 
vs sentence refused 
Cohabiting Life/30 yrs 
R v. Caroulus [2011] VSC 583 
Justice Elizabeth 
Hollingworth 
Plea-murder Cohabiting 21 yrs/17 yrs 
R v. Mulhall [2012] VSC 471 
Justice Betty King 
Plea-murder Cohabiting 19 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. Mocenigo [2012] VSC 
599R 
Justice Lex Lasry 









Cohabiting 22 yrs/18 yrs 
 
 
11 yrs/8 yrs 
DPP v. Azizi [2013] VSC 16  
Justice Stephen Kaye 
Retrial-murder-FG-
murder 
Married 20yrs/16 yrs 
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DPP v. Grant [2013] VSC 53 
Justice Robert Osborn 
Plea-murder Sexual relationship 20 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. Delich [2013] VSC 309 
Justice Lex Lasry 
Delich v. R [2014] VSCA 66 
Plea-murder 
 
Appeal vs sentence 
dismissed 
Divorced 20 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. McPhee [2013] VSC 581 
Justice Elizabeth Curtain 




Appeal vs sentence 
upheld 
Married 20 yrs/16 yrs 
 
 
18 yrs/13 yrs 
R v. Stoneham [2013] VSC 
661 
Justice Michael Croucher 
Plea-murder Former sexual 
relationship 
19 yrs/14.6 yrs 
R v. Meade [2013] VSC 682 
Justce Mark Weinberg 
Meade v. R; DPP v. Meade 
[2015] VSCA 171 
Trial-murder-FG 
murder 
D’s appeal vs 
conviction; DPP’s 
appeal vs sentence: 
both dismissed 
Divorced 23 yrs/19 yrs 
R v. Misalis [2014] VSC 617 
Justice Betty King 
Trial-murder-FG 
murder 
Married 22 yrs 
R v. Klaussner [2015] VSC 
296 





R v. Cook [2015] VSC 406 
Justice James Elliot 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Cohabiting 21.6 yrs/17.6 yrs 
R v. Daing [2015] VSC 440 
Justice Terence Forrest 
Plea-murder Sexual relationship 18.6 yrs/14.6 yrs 
R v. Freeman [2015] VSC 
506 
Justice Michael Croucher 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Sexual relationship 19 yrs/15 yrs 
R v. Browning [2015[ VSC 
556 
Justice Lex Lasry 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
Married 18 yrs/14 yrs 
R v. Singh [2015] VSC 738 
Justice Lex Lasry 
Plea-murder Married 22 yrs/17 yrs 
DPP v. Pennisi [2008] VSC 
498 
Justice David Harper 
 







DPP appeal vs 
sentence dismissed  
Cohabiting 10 yrs/7 yrs 
DPP v. Sherna [2009] VSC 4 
Justice David Beach  
Trial-murder-FG-
mans UDA 
Cohabiting 14 yrs/10 yrs 
61 
 
Sherna v. R [2011] VSCA 242  
Appeal vs sentence 
dismissed 
R v. Reid [2009] VSC 326 
Justice Simon Whelan 
 






leave to appeal vs 
conviction and 
sentence refused 
Cohabiting 5 yrs/3 yrs 
R v. Lubik [2011] VSC 137 
Justice Ross Robson  
Trial-murder-FG-
mans UDA 
Married 9.6 yrs/6.6 yrs 
R v. Lai [2015] VSC 346 
Justice Michael Croucher 
Trial-murder-FG-
mans CN 
Sexual relationship 9.5 yrs/6.11 yrs 
R v. Middendorp [2010] VSC 
202 
Justice David Byrne 






leave to appeal vs 
conviction refused; 
appeal vs sentence 
dismissed 
Cohabiting 12 yrs/8 yrs 
R v. Jagroop [2008] VSC 25 Plea-mans CN Married 10 yrs/7 yrs 
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Justice Bernard Teague 
R v. Jagroop [2009] VSCA 46 
 
Appeal vs sentence 
upheld 
 
8 yrs/5.5 yrs 
R v. Andrew [2008] VSC 138 
Justice John Forrest 
Plea-mans UDA Cohabiting 10 yrs/7 yrs 




Plea-mans UDA Cohabiting 9 yrs/6 yrs 
DPP v. Rolfe [2008] VSC 528 
Justice Phillip Cummins 
Plea-manslaughter 
by suicide pact 
Married 2 yrs wholly 
suspended 
R v. Drummond [2012] VSC 
505 
Justice Elizabeth Curtain 
Plea-mans UDA Cohabiting 10 yrs/7 yrs 
R v. Ahmadi [2013] VSC 293 
Justice Elizabeth Curtain 
Plea-mans UDA Married 11 yrs/7 yrs 
R v. Torun [2014] VSC 146 
Justice Michael Croucher 
DPP v Torun [2015] VSCA 15 
Plea-mans UDA 
 
DPP’s appeal vs 
sentence dismissed 
Cohabiting 8 yrs/5 yrs 




Ex-wife and her new 
partner 
13 yrs/10 yrs 
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Justice Lex Lasry 
 
Table 2 - Cases of men who killed men (sexual jealousy/male rivalry), 2005-2015 (n = 10) 
Case citation and Judge Plea or Trial Relationship 
between person 
who killed and 
deceased 
Sentence Max/min 
R v. Sok [2012] VSC 229 
Justice David Beach 
Plea-murder Friend of D’s girlfriend. 18 yrs/14 yrs 
R v. Budimir [2013] VSC 149  
Justice Geoffrey Nettle 
Trial-murder-FG-
murder 
D’s estranged wife’s 
new partner 
18 yrs/16 yrs 
R v. Neacsu [2013] VSC 388  
Justice Betty King 
Plea-murder D’s estranged wife’s 
new partner 
17.6 yrs/14.6 yrs 
R v. Wentholt [2013] VSC 
540 
Justice Terence Forrest 
Plea-reckless 
murder (+ one 




interested in D’s 
girlfriend 
18.6 yrs/15 yrs 
R v. West [2013] VSC 737 
Justice Elizabeth Curtain 
Plea-murder Friend of D’s ex-
girlfriend 
20 yrs/16 yrs 
DPP v. Borthwick [2010] VSC 
613  
Justice Katherine Williams 
Trial-murder-FG 
mans CN 
D’s ex- girlfriend’s new 
partner 
7.6 yrs/5 yrs 
DPP v. Kelly [2012] VSC 398 Plea-mans UDA Friend of D’s girlfriend 7 yrs/5 yrs 
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Justice Stephen Kaye 
R v. Sharp [2015] VSC 116 
Justice Phillip Priest 
Plea-mans UDA Boyfriend of woman 
flirting with D 
8 yrs/4 yrs 
DPP v. Townsend [2015] VSC 
456 
Justice Stephen Kaye 
Plea-mans UDA Friend of D’s girlfriend 7 yrs/5 yrs 
R v. Edwards [2008] VSC 297 
Justice Simon Whelan 
Plea-defensive 
homicide 
D’s ex-girlfriend’s new 
partner 




1 The common law test for provocation is stated in Masciantonio v. R (1995) 183 CLR 58 
[67]. 
2 During the period of our study there were 13 cases in Victoria in which women were 
convicted of killing intimate partners and one case in which a woman was convicted of 
killing a female sexual rival. This was less than one quarter of the number of male domestic 
homicide cases. 
3 While there was much public dissatisfaction surrounding the way in which the offence of 
defensive homicide operated, ‘[m]uch of this criticism [was] in response to the number of 
men who [were] convicted of defensive homicide’ for killing other men (Crofts and Tyson, 
2014: 887; see also Department of Justice 2010, 2013; Ulbrick et al., 2016). 
4 At common law, mere words without more could never constitute provocation sufficient 
to reduce murder to manslaughter: see Holmes v. DPP [1946] AC 588; Moffa v. R [1977] HCA 
14.  
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5 The much lighter sentence imposed in this case was due to the fact that it was a ‘mercy 
killing’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
